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Naquin v. Elevating Boats, LLC: 
The Fifth Circuit’s Improper 
Expansion of Jones Act “Seaman 
Status” Qualification 
 
Timothy M. O’Hara 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Imagine a deckhand that works aboard vessels utilized in 
offshore drilling and dredging operations.1  As a deckhand, he 
must maintain the decks and superstructure, and assist with 
mooring and cargo handling.2  He is employed by the owner of a 
fleet of vessels and required to work at offshore job sites for 
extended periods of time.3  While assigned to an offshore site, 
he works every day, sleeps aboard the vessel at night, and 
returns to shore when the job is completed.4 
For the sake of comparison, now imagine a vessel 
repairman that works at a shipyard for a vessel service 
company.5  He works on vessels that are either moored or 
docked in the immediate area, or lifted up by a crane in the 
company shipyard.6  He spends roughly seventy percent of his 
time aboard these secured vessels performing repairs, 
replacements, and maintenance activities, and thirty percent of 
 
1. See Naylor v. Atl. Sounding Co., 481 F. App’x. 173 (5th Cir. 2012). 
2. MARINE TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, INC., http://marinetransportation 
services.com/deckhand.pdf (last visited August 14, 2015); SOUTHERN TOWING 
CO., http://southerntowing.net/downloads/deckhand-job-description.pdf (last 
visited August 14, 2015). 
3. See generally Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 560 
(1997) (holding that an employee whose work was not “of a seagoing nature” 
could not qualify as a seaman). 
4. Yelverton v. Mobile Labs., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 400,402-03, 406 (S.D. 
Miss. 1985), aff’d, 782 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1986). 
5. See Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 2014). 
6. Id. 
1
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his time performing duties in the shipyard.7  He goes home at 
the end of every workday and is rarely aboard the vessels while 
such are at open water.8 
Which employee is exposed to the dangers of 
“unpredictable weather, rough tides, sudden sickness, and 
exhausting labour”9 that accompany working at sea?  According 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the 
answer is both.  In March 2014, in Naquin v. Elevating Boats, 
L.L.C., a majority of that court held that the second worker 
qualified as the type of maritime employee that Congress 
decided to provide heightened legal protections because of the 
risks involved in working at sea.10  A strongly written dissent 
followed and asserted that this was not the type of worker that 
Congress had in mind.11  This is just the latest chapter in the 
federal courts’ lengthy novel about the treatment of maritime 
workers in personal injury cases. 
The story began nearly a century ago, when Congress 
enacted the Jones Act and effectively made “seamen the most 
generously treated personal injury victims in American law.”12  
But defining a Jones Act seaman has not come easy, as it took 
the United States Supreme Court seventy five years to arrive 
at the modern seaman status test.13  This commentary 
examines the “tortured history”14 of the Jones Act, how 
qualification for the statute’s protections has evolved, the 
modern seaman status test, and the implications of the Fifth 
Circuit’s recent application thereof.  Section II gives a brief 
history and explanation of maritime law in the United States 
and the sources of federal court jurisdiction over maritime 
 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 483 (C.C.D. Me. 1823). 
10. See generally Naquin, 744 F. 3d 927. 
11. Id. at 941-44. 
12. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012); Shailendra U. Kulkarni, The Seaman 
Status Situation: Historical Perspectives and Modern Movements in the U.S. 
Remedial Regime, 31 TUL. MAR. L.J. 121, 121 (2006) (citing David W. 
Robertson, The Supreme Court’s Approach to Determining Seaman Status: 
Discerning the Law Amid Loose Language and Catchphrases, 34 J. MAR. L. & 
COM. 547, 547 (2003)). 
13. See generally Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995). 
14. Id. at 358. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/8
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cases.  Section III discusses pre-Jones Act maritime personal 
injury claims and the significance that the statute’s enactment 
has had on the maritime industry.  Section IV discusses the 
evolution of the seaman status test to the modern framework.  
Section V discusses the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Naquin v. 
Elevating Boats, L.L.C. Section VI discusses the implications of 
this holding and proposes an adjustment to the seaman status 
test. 
 
II.   Maritime Law in the United States 
 
A. What is Maritime Law? 
 
Generally, “admiralty [law] is viewed as a legal realm that 
is—because of historical and practical considerations—weird 
and different.”15  It regulates the settlement of problems 
arising from sea navigation and commerce.16  Where relevant 
statutory law is lacking, an admiralty court will apply the 
general maritime law.17  General maritime law is judge-made 
federal common law that is drawn from many sources.18  When 
clear general maritime law precedent is absent, courts may 
look to, but are not bound by, the prevailing land law.19  Where 
relevant legislation and precedent are both lacking, admiralty 
courts may impose their own rule.20  However, this authority is 
subject to limitation, as the courts’ role is to adjust and not to 
revolutionize.21 
 
15. See David J. Bederman, Law of the Land, Law of the Sea: The Lost 
Link Between Customary International Law and the General Maritime Law, 
51 VA. J. INT’L L. 299, 302 (2011). See also Ernest A. Young, Preemption at 
Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 305 (1998). 
16. 2 C.J.S. Admiralty § 1 (2014) (citing United States v. Matson Nav. 
Co., 201 F.2d 610 (9th Cir 1953)). 
17. Id., at § 3 (citing East River S.S. Corp. v. Transam. Delaval, Inc., 476 
U.S. 858 (1986)). 
18. Id. (citing Fairest-Knight v. Marine World Distributors, Inc., 652 
F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 2011)). 
19. Id. (citing Igneri v. Cie. De Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257 (2d 
Cir. 1963); Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 
630-32 (1959); Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956)). 
20. Id. (citing Trinh ex rel Tran v. Dufrene Boats, Inc. 6 So. 3d 830, 839 
(La. Ct. App. 2009)). 
21. Id. (citing Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 929, 939 (D. 
3
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B. Federal Court Jurisdiction of Maritime Cases 
 
1.  Statutory Authority 
 
The federal courts’ jurisdiction over maritime cases comes 
from several sources.  The United States Constitution reads, in 
relevant part, that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all 
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under their authority; . . . to all Cases of admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction.”22  This constitutional authority is 
codified in title 28 United States Code section 1333(1), under 
which federal district courts have original jurisdiction, 
exclusive of state courts, over “[a]ny civil case of admiralty or 
maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other 
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”23 
 
2.  Judicial Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) 
 
The traditional test for determining whether the federal 
courts had maritime jurisdiction over a case was based on the 
locality of the wrong.24  That is, “[i]f the wrong occurred on 
navigable waters, the action is within admiralty jurisdiction; if 
the wrong occurred on land, it is not.”25  The United States 
Supreme Court overruled the locality test in Executive Jet 
Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, holding that maritime 
jurisdiction based solely on the placement of the wrong was 
absurd.26  The Court held that section 1333(1) jurisdiction 
requires a “maritime nexus,” involving some relationship 
 
Del. 1962). 
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). See also 2 AM. JUR. 2d Admiralty § 9 (2014) 
(citing White v. United States, 53 F.3d 43, 45 (4th Cir. 1995)). 
24. See Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 253 
(1972). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 261. (The court compares this to conferring admiralty 
jurisdiction to a swimmer at a public beach, injured by another swimmer or a 
submerged object). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/8
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between the tort and traditional maritime activities relating to 
navigation or commerce on navigable waters.27 
The Court refined this concept in Foremost Insurance Co. 
v. Richardson, holding that section 1333(1) jurisdiction extends 
to cases of damage or injury on navigable waters where the 
alleged wrong bears a significant relationship to a traditional 
maritime activity, commercial or otherwise.28  Factors that are 
significant to this analysis include the functions and roles of 
the parties, the involved vehicles and instruments, the type 
and cause of injury, and the traditional concepts of the role of 
admiralty law.29 
 
III.   Personal Injury Claims of Maritime Workers 
 
A. The Osceola 
 
In the pre-Jones Act era, the federal courts treated seamen 
negligence claims against their employers harshly.30  In fact, 
seamen did not have a viable claim to damages when injured as 
a result of their employers’ negligence.31  In The Osceola, the 
plaintiff, an employee of the defendant vessel owner, was 
aboard a moving vessel when he and other crew members were 
ordered to use a derrick32 to lift the gangways,33 although the 
vessel was at open sea and proceeding against strong winds.34  
He was struck and injured when the winds pushed the 
gangway and derrick over.35  The United States Supreme Court 
denied the plaintiff’s right to sue his employer for negligence 
and announced four rules relating thereto: 
 
27. Id. at 256. 
28. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982). 
29. John B. Spitzer, Annotation, Admiralty jurisdiction: maritime nature 
of tort – modern cases, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 105 (1986). 
30. See Courtney L. Collins, The Act Up the Sleeve: Federal Courts Allow 
Employer Counterclaims for Property Damage to Wipe Out the Jones Act 
Claims of Seamen, 37 TUL. MAR. L.J. 175, 177 (2012). See also 2 ROBERT 
FORCE & MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN §30:2 (5th ed. 2011). 
31. Collins, supra note 30, at 177. 
32. A crane-like device. 
33. A movable platform used to board and disembark a vessel. 
34. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 159 (1903). 
35. Id. 
5
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1. That the vessel and her owners are liable, in 
case a seaman falls sick, or is wounded, in the 
service of the ship, to the extent of his 
maintenance and cure, and to his wages, at least 
so long as the voyage is continued. 
2.  That the vessel and her owner are, both by 
English and American law, liable to an 
indemnity for injuries received by seamen in 
consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, 
or a failure to supply and keep in order the 
proper appliances appurtenant to the ship. 
3.  That all members of the crew, except, 
perhaps, the master, are, as between themselves 
fellow servants, and hence seamen cannot 
recover for injuries sustained through the 
negligence of another member of the crew beyond 
the expense of maintenance and cure. 
4.  That the seaman is not allowed to recover an 
indemnity for the negligence of the master, or 
any member of the crew, but is entitled to 
maintenance and cure, whether the injuries were 
received by negligence or accident.36 
 
The Court effectively limited a seaman’s recovery for 
injuries caused by his employer’s negligence to maintenance 
and cure, a duty imposed on vessel owners by reason of the 
employment contract that does not depend on the negligence of 
the vessel owner and is not limited to injuries sustained in the 
course of a seaman’s employment.37  Maintenance includes that 
which the seaman is entitled to while at sea, such as living 
expenses.38  Cure includes the care, nursing, and medical 
expenses incurred in the period during which the duty 
continues.39  Additionally, a seaman’s right to damages was 
limited to injuries resulting from a vessel’s unseaworthiness.40 
 
36. Id. at 175. 
37. Id. at 175; Calmar S. S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527 (1938). 
38. Calmar S.S. Corp., 303 U.S. at 528. 
39. Id. 
40. Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/8
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B. Jones Act Enactment 
 
The Osceola holding, rendered in 1903, brought to 
Congress’s attention the inadequacies of the recovery scheme 
for seaman under the general maritime law.41  At this time, 
personal injury actions were experiencing change, as “modern 
workers’ compensation schemes were increasingly available to 
certain land-based workers and railroad employees were 
afforded liberal actions against their employers.”42  But, despite 
the federal courts’ acknowledgement that the nature of their 
employment exposed them to greater dangers, seamen were 
afforded less generous treatment than their land based 
counterparts.43  The imbalance needed rectifying. 
In 1920, Congress attempted to resolve the disparity by 
enacting the Merchant Marine Act, more commonly known as 
the Jones Act, which granted seamen the same remedies 
afforded railway employees under the Federal Employers 
Liability Act  of 1908 (“FELA”), including a cause of action 
based on the negligence of one’s employer.44  The Jones Act 
states: 
 
A seaman injured in the course of employment 
or, if the seaman dies from the injury, the 
personal representative of the seaman may elect 
to bring a civil action at law, with the right of 
trial by jury, against the employer. Laws of the 
United States regulating recovery for personal 
injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply 
to an action under this section.45 
 
 
41. See Kulkarni, supra note 12, at 126. 
42. Id. (citing Taylor Simpson-Wood, Loose Lips Launch Ships: Stewart 
v. Dutra Construction Company, Inc., 37 J. MAR. L. & COM. 113, 119 (2006). 
43. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 483 (1823) (Circuit Justice Story 
stating that “Seamen are by the peculiarity of their lives, liable to sudden 
sickness from change of climate, exposure to perils, and exhausting labor.”). 
44. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995); Simpson-Wood, 
supra note 42, at 119. See also 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2012); Kulkarni, supra 
note 12, at 127. 
45. 46 U.S.C. § 30104. 
7
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This enactment completed the trilogy of heightened legal 
protections provided to seamen because of their exposure to the 
perils of the sea: 1) maintenance and cure; 2) damages for 
injuries resulting from a vessel’s unseaworthiness; and 3) 
damages for injuries resulting from the negligence of a vessel 
owner.46  Significantly, Congress did not define the term 
seamen, failing to clarify exactly which workers qualified for 
Jones Act protection.47  This omission “ultimately cause[d] 
great inconsistency and confusion” in federal courts for the 
next century.48 
 
C. Early Interpretation of the “Seamen” Definition 
 
Before Congress enacted the Jones Act, the general 
maritime law employed a broad definition of the term seaman 
and granted that status to “virtually anyone who worked with 
or aboard any kind of vessel capable of any kind of 
movement.”49  Workers afforded seamen status included 
sailors, vessel officers, bartenders, cabin boys, carpenters, 
chambermaids, clerks, cooks, coopers, divers, doctors, dredge 
workers, engineers, firemen, fishermen, harpooners, horsemen, 
interpreters, masons, muleteers, musicians, pilots, pursers, 
radio operators, seal hunters, stewards, surveyors, and 
waiters.50 
In International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, a case 
involving a stevedore51 who was struck and injured when a 
supervisor, employed by the defendant-vessel owner, 
negligently caused freight to fall from the vessel, the United 
States Supreme Court considered the reach of the Jones Act.52  
The Court held that, although stevedores are not seamen for 
most purposes, the work in which the plaintiff was engaged 
was a maritime service.53  It did not believe “Congress willingly 
 
46. Kulkarni, supra note 12, at 122. 
47. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 355. 
48. Kulkarni, supra note 12, at 127. 
49. Robertson, supra note 12, at 554. 
50. E.g., Robertson, supra note 12, at 554-55. 
51. A person employed at a dock, to load and unload cargo from ships. 
52. See generally 272 U.S. 50 (1926). 
53. Id. at 51-52. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/8
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would have allowed the protection to men engaged upon the 
same maritime duties to vary with the accident of their being 
employed by a stevedore rather than a ship.”54  As one 
commentator has noted, the Haverty Court interpreted the 
Jones Act as making seaman status more inclusive, as opposed 
to restrictive.55 
 
D. The Longshoreman and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act 
 
After the Court’s Haverty decision, the “inconsistent,” 
“confus[ing],” “befuddling,” and “wayward” process of 
restricting the seamen definition began.56  Congress 
unmistakably disapproved of that Court’s interpretation of a 
Jones Act seaman, taking just six months to enact the 
Longshoremen and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act 
(“LHWCA”).57  This was the first of many steps taken to restrict 
the definition of a Jones Act seaman. 
The LHWCA provides workers’ compensation benefits to 
covered maritime employees for injuries incurred within the 
scope of one’s employment on the navigable waters of the 
United States, including an adjoining pier, wharf dry dock, 
terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area 
customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, 
repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel.58  It also provides 
maritime workers a right to sue for negligence as third parties 
in certain circumstances.59  Most importantly, the LHWCA 
specifically excludes “any master or member of the crew of any 
vessel” from its coverage.60 Significantly, the LHWCA does not 
give an explicit definition of “master or member of the crew of 
any vessel,” but the United States Supreme Court, in bizarre 
 
54. Id. 
55. See Robertson, supra note 12, at 555. 
56. Robertson, supra note 12, at 555,(citing McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. 
Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 348-53 (1991)). 
57. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-9501. See Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1, 5-6 
(1946). 
58. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). 
59. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (“In the event of injury to a person covered under 
this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person...may 
bring an action against such vessel as a third party”). 
60. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(g). 
9
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fashion, used this language to define a Jones Act seaman.61  In 
Swanson v. Marra Bros., the Court dismissed the plaintiff-
stevedore’s Jones Act claim, holding that he was not a seaman: 
 
We must take it that the effect of these 
provisions of the Longshoremen’s Act is to 
confine the benefits of the Jones Act to the 
members of the crew of a vessel plying in 
navigable waters and to substitute for the right 
of recovery recognized by the Haverty case only 
such rights to compensation as are given by the 
Longshoremen’s Act.62 
 
The Court effectively declared seaman, as used in the Jones 
Act, and “master or member of a crew of any vessel,” as used in 
the LHWCA, to be interchangeable phrases.63  Thus, with the 
Jones Act’s inclusion of seaman, and the LHWCA’s exclusion of 
“any master or member of a crew of any vessel,” the Swanson 
Court interpreted the compensation regimes as mutually 
exclusive.64  It is worth noting that the mutually exclusive 
nature of these statutory remedies has been complicated in 
modern application.65  The strange approach taken by the 
Court in tackling the definition of a Jones Act seaman has 
 
61. See Robertson, supra note 22 at 555-56. 
62. Swanson, 328 U.S. at -3, 7 
63. Kulkarni, supra note 12, at 129-30. 
64. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1995). 
65. While the Jones Act’s “seaman” and LHWCA “master or member of a 
crew” are synonymous, there is a “zone of uncertainty” where a fact finder 
may reasonably find coverage under either act. For example, there may be 
conflicting evidence concerning a particular worker’s duties or undisputed 
evidence about a particular worker’s duties that exhibits characteristics of 
both traditionally land and sea based duties. A discussion of this issue is 
beyond the scope of this commentary. See Evan T. Caffrey, Splicing the Net: A 
Legislative Answer to the Problem of Seaman Status Under the Jones Act, 14 
TUL. MAR. L.J. 361, 372-73 (1990); Kenneth J. Reimer, Showdown in the Fifth 
Circuit: Legros v. Panther Services Group, Inc., 13 TUL. MAR. L.J. 341 (1989). 
See also Chenevert v. Travelers Indem. Co., 746 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(holding that "an insurer who makes voluntary LHWCA payments to an 
injured employee on behalf of a ship owner/employer is entitled to recover 
these payments from the employee’s settlement of a Jones Act claim against 
the ship owner/employer based on the same injuries for which the insurer has 
already compensated him." ). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/8
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invited criticism.  One commentator has asserted that, “[t]he 
Swanson Court’s conclusion . . . has led to a judicial course 
which is far different than the one originally envisioned by 
Congress for both shore-based and sea-based maritime 
workers.”66  But regardless of the means employed, by enacting 
the LHWCA and issuing the Swanson holding, Congress and 
the Court, respectively, made clear that seaman, as used in the 
Jones Act, was a restrictive term reserved for a very particular 
class of workers. 
 
E. Advantages of Qualifying as a Jones Act Seaman 
 
Seamen are “the most generously-treated personal injury 
victims in American law.”67  The advantages accompanying the 
protections of the Jones Act motivate maritime plaintiffs to 
vigorously seek seaman status.  First, the burden on a seaman 
to establish employer negligence is “very light” and 
“featherweight.”68  Second, Jones Act seamen are entitled to 
damages for the unseaworthiness of a vessel, and vessel 
owners’ face strict liability and a non-delegable duty under 
such claims.69  Third, Jones Act seamen are also entitled to 
maintenance and cure payments,70 of which there are no 
limitations on amount or duration.71  Fourth, the Jones Act 
grants a plaintiff the right to a jury trial, providing a greater 
potential for a substantial damages award.72 
In comparison, the benefits offered by the LHWCA are far 
less generous.  First, the LHWCA’s workers’ compensation 
scheme, while similar to maintenance and cure, is 
 
66. Simpson-Wood, supra note 42, at 123. 
67. Robertson, supra note 12, at 547 (citing ROBERTSON, ET AL., 
ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 240 (2001)). 
68. Michael A. Orlando, Supreme Court Rules a Dredge Is a Jones Act 
Vessel, INT’L RISK MANAGEMENT INST. (March 2005), 
http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2005/orlando03.aspx?cmd=print (citing 
Zapata Haynie Corp., v. Arthur, 980 F.2d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 1992)). See 
Kulkarni, supra note 12, at 123. 
69. Orlando, supra note 68. 
70. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text. 
71. Orlando, supra note 68. 
72. Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012); Orlando, supra note 68. 
11
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distinguishable by its various limitations.73  For example, there 
is a cap on available compensation, equal to two hundred 
percent of the applicable national average weekly wage.74  
Similarly, while Section 905(b) of the LHWCA permits a cause 
of action against a vessel for unseaworthiness, the maritime 
worker’s burden in establishing causation is that of regular 
negligence.75  Additionally, the LHWCA’s compensation 
structure is managed by the federal government, whereby the 
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs determines the 
precise amount of compensation awarded to the non-seaman 
maritime worker.76  Finally, the LHWCA does not provide a 
qualified injured maritime employee with a negligence action 
against his employer—”[i]n exchange for no fault-liability for 
limited compensation benefits owed to their non-seaman 
employees, employers of such non-seamen garner immunity 
from tort liability.”77 
The advantages of qualifying as a Jones Act seaman are 
obvious. As summarized by one commentator, “while the Jones 
Act seaman, bearing his ‘featherweight’ burden of proof, may 
have a legal remedy for his employer’s negligence, the non-
seaman is relegated to workers’ compensation benefits under a 
scheme that is arguably less generous than even the seaman’s 
additional remedy of maintenance and cure.”78 
 
IV.    The Jones Act Seaman Status Tests 
 
In the seventy five years following Congress’s enactment of 
the Jones Act, the federal courts’ determination of who 
qualifies as a seaman was far from simple.  The issue was 
frequently revisited by the United States Supreme Court, with 
analytical adjustments made upon each consideration.  As one 
commentator has noted, the seaman status issue’s instability 
caused a great deal of frustration and contradicted the 
 
73. 33 U.S.C. §906(b). See Kulkarni, supra note 12, at 124. 
74. Id. 
75. See Kulkami, supra note 12, at 123-24 (citing Orlando, supra note 
68). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 125. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/8
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principles of predictability expected of a stare decisis judicial 
system.79 
In 1941, the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit considered the seaman status question in Carumbo v. 
Cape Cod S.S. Co., and held that a Jones Act seaman and 
LHWCA “member of a crew” were not interchangeable terms.80  
A Jones Act seaman was any person employed or engaged to 
serve aboard a vessel in any capacity.81  Qualification as a 
LHWCA “member of a crew” required that the ship be in 
navigation, that the worker, more or less, have a permanent 
connection with the ship, and that he primarily aid in 
navigation.82  Despite the subsequent overruling Swanson 
holding,83 the language of the Carumbo “member of a crew” 
requirements was retained in future seaman status tests 
advanced by the United States Supreme Court. 
In 1943, in O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 
the Court considered the case of a deckhand injured by a falling 
counterweight after he was ordered ashore.84  The Court held 
that the plaintiff was a Jones Act seaman and adopted a status 
based seaman status test: 
 
The right of recovery in the Jones Act is given to 
the seaman as such, and, as in the case of 
maintenance and cure, the admiralty jurisdiction 
over the suit depends not on the place where the 
injury is inflicted but on the nature of the service 
and its relationship to the operation of the vessel 
plying in navigable waters.85   
 
This extended the traditional general maritime law principles 
 
79. See John R. Hillsman, Still Lost in the Labyrinth: The Continuing 
Puzzle of Seaman Status, 15 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 49, 50 (2002). 
80. Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co., 123 F.2d 991, 994 (1st Cir. 1941). 
81. Id. at 994-95. 
82. Id. at 995. 
83. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
84. See generally O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 
36 (1943). 
85. Id. at 42-43. This was a drastic step from the Haverty line of cases 
which called for “seaman” status to be determined based on the location and 
type of activity performed when injured. 
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applied to maintenance and cure to the seaman’s newly created 
rights under the Jones Act and indicated the desire for a purely 
status based inquiry.86 
In 1952, the United States Supreme Court took steps 
backwards in Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co, a case involving 
a boat operator who was killed when a fire extinguisher 
handled by a colleague exploded as they prepared the 
defendants’ boats for the summer season.87  The Court held 
that Jones Act seaman status “depends largely on the facts of 
the particular case and the activity in which he was engaged at 
the time of the injury” and that the decedent’s activities at the 
time of the accident were not those typically done by seaman, 
but “by exclusively shore-based personnel.”88  Even though the 
decedent would resume boat operating activities come summer, 
“[t]he fact that he had been, or expected in the future to be, a 
seaman does not render maritime work which was not 
maritime in its nature.”89  This was a retreat from the status 
based inquiry adopted in O’Donnell and return to the Haverty 
analysis that had been deemed incorrect. 
The issue was revisited just six years later in Grimes v. 
Raymond Concrete Pile Co, a case involving a pile driver that 
typically worked ashore, was sent to work from a barge at sea 
for several hours, and was injured aboard a tugboat as it 
returned to shore.90  The United States Supreme Court held 
that the evidence was enough to create a factual question as to 
the plaintiff’s seaman status.91  In a dissenting opinion, Justice 
Harlan claimed that the majority disregarded the principles 
outlined in O’Donnell and Swanson and reduced the seaman 
definition to “nothing more than a person injured while 
working at sea.”92  He believed a greater connection was needed 
to be a Jones Act seaman.93  Albeit through a dissenting 
opinion, the desire for restrictive, status based definition of 
 
86. See generally id. 
87. 342 U.S. 187, 188-90 (1952). 
88. Id. at 190. 
89. Id. at 191 (citing Antus v. Interocean S.S. Co., 108 F.2d 185, 187 (6th 
Cir. 1939)). 
90. 356 U.S. 252, 252-55(1958). 
91. Id. at 253. 
92. Id. at 255. 
93. Id. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/8
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seaman was clear. 
In 1959, in Offshore Co. v. Robinson, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the case of a 
general laborer and driller’s helper that was assigned to a 
drilling platform mounted on an engineless barge.94  He 
severely fractured his leg as he tried to avoid sixteen hundred 
pounds of piping catapulting towards him, an accident, in part, 
caused by his employer’s failure to provide additional safety 
personnel.95  The Fifth Circuit held that: 
 
[T]here is an evidentiary basis for a Jones Act 
case to go to the jury: (1) if there is evidence that 
the injured workman was assigned permanently 
to a vessel . . . or performed a substantial part of 
his work on the vessel; and (2) if the capacity in 
which he was employed or the duties which he 
performed contributed to the function of the 
vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission, or 
to the operation or welfare of the vessel in terms 
of its maintenance during its movement or 
during anchorage for its future trips.96 
 
This holding returned the analysis to the status based inquiry 
established in O’Donnell and Swanson and advocated by 
Justice Harlan in Grimes. Just one year later, the Fifth Circuit 
modified the Robinson test and held that a connection to an 
identifiable fleet of vessels or a finite group of vessels under 
common ownership were sufficient to achieve seaman status.97 
The modified Robinson test eventually became the 
prevalent seaman status test among the federal circuits, 
influencing Jones Act cases reviewed in the First,98 Eighth,99 
 
94. 266 F.2d 769, 771-72 (5th Cir. 1959). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 779. 
97. See generally Braniff v. Jackson Ave.-Gretna Ferry, Inc., 280 F.2d 
523 (5th Cir. 1960). 
98. See Bennett v. Perini Corp., 510 F.2d 114, 115 (1st Cir. 1975). 
99. See Miller v. Patton-Tully Transp. Co., 851 F.2d 202, 204 (8th Cir. 
1988). 
15
  
2015 IMPROPER EXPANSION 277 
and Eleventh Circuits.100  For the next thirty five years, the 
modified Robinson test and the Carumbo “member of a crew” 
test were recognized and applied, with slight variations, in 
every federal circuit to consider the seaman status issue.101  
The consensus was that the proper analysis involved a status 
based inquiry.  That is, each circuit required that a maritime 
worker have a significant connection to a vessel in navigation, 
or identifiable fleet of vessels, and, if not a more or less 
permanent connection to such, at least substantial work aboard 
a vessel.102 
In following years, the Fifth Circuit added a temporal 
element to the seaman status analysis.103  In Barrett v. 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., the plaintiff was a welder’s helper that 
sometimes performed maintenance and repair work from 
offshore platforms.104  Approximately seventy to eighty percent 
of his work was performed on platforms where no auxiliary 
vessel was needed.105  At the time of his injury, the plaintiff 
was performing welding services on a caisson106 located ten to 
twelve miles offshore.107  A barge was positioned alongside the 
caisson for equipment and material storage and remained 
stationary until the assignment’s completion.108  The plaintiff 
initially injured his back while on the boat that transferred 
him to the job site, and hurt it a second time the next day while 
attempting to lift a heavy pipe on the barge.109  The Fifth 
Circuit held that, “if the employee’s regularly assigned duties 
require him to divide his time between vessel and land (or 
platform) his status as a crew member is determined ‘in the 
context of his entire employment’ with his current employer.”110  
 
100. See Caruso v. Sterling Yacht & Shipbuilders, Inc., 828 F.2d 14, 15 
(11th Cir. 1987). 
101. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 367 (1995). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 366. 
104. Barrett v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 1068 (5th Cir. 
1986). 
105. Id. 
106. A watertight chamber used in construction work under water. 
107. Barrett, 781 F.2d at 1069. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 1075. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/8
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Because only twenty to thirty percent of the plaintiff’s overall 
employment duties involved working from vessels, he did not 
qualify as a Jones Act seaman.111  Since the Barrett decision, 
the Fifth Circuit has declined to confer seaman status where 
the worker spends less than thirty percent of his time aboard 
vessels.112 
The United States Supreme Court set the stage for the 
modern seaman status test in 1991. In McDermott 
International Inc. v. Wilander, the plaintiff was a paint 
foreman that supervised sandblasting and painting work done 
on oil drilling platforms.113  While assigned to a vessel, he was 
struck in the head by a bolt that blew out under pressure.114  
The Court granted certiorari to analyze and compare the 
“contribute to the function of the vessel” requirement of the 
Robinson test with the “aid in navigation” requirement of the 
Carumbo test.115  Ultimately, the Court abandoned the “aid in 
navigation” requirement in favor of an analysis that focused on 
an employee’s connection to a vessel in navigation.116  
Explaining that all employees who work at sea in the service of 
ship are exposed to the perils which Congress intended to protect 
against, the Court held that it is not the employee’s particular 
job but his connection to a vessel that is determinative:117 
 
In this regard, we believe the requirement that 
an employee’s duties must ‘contribut[e] to the 
function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of 
its mission’ captures well an important 
requirement of seaman status. It is not necessary 
that a seaman aid in navigation or contribute to 
the transportation of the vessel, but a seaman 
must be doing the ships work.118 
 
 
111. Id. at 1076. 
112. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 367 (1995). 
113. McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 339 (1991). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 340. 
116. Id. at 354. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 355. 
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The question of seaman status became a mixed question of law 
and fact.119  The inquiry was status based and dependent upon 
whether an employee’s connection to a vessel, or fleet of 
vessels, exposed him to the dangers involved in working at sea 
that motivated Congress’s enactment of the statute in 1920.120 
The Wilander holding was refined into the modern seaman 
status test four years later in Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis.121  The 
plaintiff, a salaried superintendent engineer, was responsible 
for maintaining and updating the electronic and 
communications equipment aboard the defendant’s fleet of 
vessels.122  His duties extended to the entire fleet, requiring 
him to both take voyages on the vessels and direct ship 
maintenance from shore.123  During a voyage to Bermuda, the 
plaintiff developed a problem in his right eye, and the vessel’s 
doctor did not follow proper medical procedure when he advised 
the plaintiff to rest for two days until the plaintiff could see an 
eye specialist ashore.124  In Bermuda, the plaintiff was 
diagnosed with a detached retina and underwent surgery.125  
He ultimately lost seventy five percent of the vision in his right 
eye and subsequently brought Jones Act claims.126  The United 
States Supreme Court reviewed the case to resolve “the 
continuing conflict among the Courts of Appeals regarding the 
appropriate requirements for seaman status under the Jones 
Act.”127  The Court acknowledged that its Wilander decision 
was a step in the right direction but held that such “did not 
consider the requisite connection to a vessel in any detail and 
therefore failed to end the prevailing confusion regarding 
seaman status.”128 
Consistent with the analysis of the Swanson, O’Donnell, 
and Wilander Courts before it, the majority rejected the 
defendant’s proposition that “anyone working on board a vessel 
 
119. Id. at 356. 
120. Id. 
121. 515 U.S. 347 (1995). 
122. Id. at 350. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 350-51. 
127. Id. at 353. 
128. Id. at 357. 
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for the duration of a ‘voyage’ in furtherance of a vessel’s 
mission has the necessary employment-related connection to 
qualify as a [Jones Act] seaman.”129  The Court explained: 
 
A brief survey of the Jones Act’s tortured history 
makes clear that we must reject the initial 
appeal of such a ‘voyage’ test and undertake the 
more difficult task of developing a status-based 
standard that, although it determines Jones Act 
coverage without regard to the precise activity in 
which the worker is engaged at the time of the 
injury, nevertheless best furthers the Jones Act’s 
remedial goals.130 
 
After examining the extensive history of Jones Act 
interpretation in the federal courts, the Court confirmed that 
“the Jones Act inquiry is fundamentally status based,” such 
that land based maritime workers do not become seaman 
because they happen to be working on a vessel at the time of 
injury and seamen do not lose Jones Act protection when their 
employment takes them ashore.131  The Court explained that 
Jones Act jurisprudence makes clear that a more enduring 
relationship between the worker and a vessel is 
contemplated.132 
In light of those principles, the Court adopted a two-prong 
seaman status test.  First, an employee’s duties must 
contribute to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment 
of its mission.133  Second, the employee must have a connection 
to a vessel in navigation, or an identifiable group of vessels, 
that is substantial in both duration and nature.134  Under the 
first requirement, initially established in Wilander, “all who 
work at sea in the service of the ship are eligible for seaman 
 
129. Id. at 358. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 361. 
132. Id. at 363 (citing Barrett v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 
1075 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
133. Id. at 368. 
134. Id. 
19
  
2015 IMPROPER EXPANSION 281 
status.”135  The second requirement is intended to separate sea 
based maritime workers, entitled to Jones Act protection, from 
land based maritime workers possessing only a “transitory or 
sporadic connection to a vessel in navigation” and who are not 
exposed to the perils of the sea in the same way.136  The 
seaman status inquiry remained a mixed question of law and 
fact, but was narrowed to only those with the requisite 
employment related connection to a vessel in navigation.137  
Also significant, the second requirement demands an 
employment related connection to a vessel in navigation that is 
substantial in both duration and nature: 
 
The duration of a worker’s connection to a vessel 
and the nature of the worker’s activities, taken 
together, determine whether a maritime 
employee is a seaman because the ultimate 
inquiry is whether the worker in question is a 
member of the vessel’s crew or simply a land-
based employee who happens to be working on a 
vessel at a given time.138 
 
While acknowledging that seaman status is not merely a 
temporal concept, the Court also held that the Barrett thirty 
percent rule, although not dispositive, should serve as a 
guideline.139  The Court stressed that departure from this 
figure “will certainly be justified in appropriate cases.”140 
Just two years later, in Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 
the Court was tasked with clarifying the second prong of the 
Chandris test.141  There, it declared that the fundamental 
purpose of the Chandris test’s “substantial connection 
requirement” was to give effect to Congress’s intent to 
distinguish sea based maritime workers from those “whose 
employment does not regularly expose them to the perils of the 
 
135. McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355 (1991). 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 369. 
138. Id. at 370. 
139. Id. at 371. See supra notes 104-112 and accompanying text. 
140. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995). 
141. Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 555 (1997). 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/8
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sea.”142  Thus, for it to serve its purpose, analysis of the second 
prong must focus on whether the employee’s duties take him to 
sea.143 
 
V. Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C. – What Happened? 
 
 In March 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit reviewed Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C.144  
Elevating Boats, L.L.C. (“EBI”) manufactures, operates and 
maintains a fleet of specialty lift-boats and marine cranes out 
of numerous Louisiana ports.145  In 2005, Edward Naquin, Sr. 
(“Naquin”) was hired at EBI’s Houma, Louisiana shipyard as a 
vessel repair supervisor, primarily responsible for the 
maintenance and repair of EBI’s lift-boat vessels.146  Naquin 
typically worked aboard the lift-boats while such were moored, 
jacked-up, or docked in the canal adjoining EBI’s shipyard.147  
Roughly seventy percent of his time was spent aboard these 
vessels, performing repairs, cleaning and painting, replacing 
defective or damaged parts, going on test runs, securing 
equipment, and operating the vessels’ marine cranes.148  About 
two or three times each week, he completed these duties while 
a given vessel was moved to another location within the 
immediate canal.149  Rarely, Naquin repaired vessels and 
served as the crane operator aboard a vessel at open water.150  
He spent the remaining thirty percent of his time working in 
the shipyard’s fabrication shop or operating the shipyard’s 
land-based crane.151 
In November 2009, Naquin was using an EBI land based 
crane to relocate a test block when the crane failed and 
toppled.152  Upon jumping from the crane house, he broke bones 
 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 2014). 
145. Id. at 930. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Naquin, 744 F.3d at 930-31. 
151. Id. at 931. 
152. Id. 
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in both of his feet and sustained a lower abdominal hernia.153  
Naquin’s cousin’s husband, also an EBI employee, was killed 
when the crane toppled onto the building he was in at the 
time.154  Subsequently, Naquin underwent several reparative 
surgeries but was unable to return to physical work due to 
residual chronic foot pains, difficulty walking, and 
depression.155  He then filed a Jones Act claim against EBI in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana.156  After qualifying him for seaman status, the jury 
found EBI to be negligent and awarded Naquin $1,000,000 for 
past and future physical pain and suffering, $1,000,000 for past 
and future mental pain and suffering, and $400,000 for future 
lost wages.157  EBI appealed the grant of Jones Act seaman 
status to Naquin.158 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit applied the two prong 
Chandris test and affirmed Naquin’s seaman status.159  First, 
the court found it clear that Naquin “did the ship’s work and 
contributed to the function of EBI’s vessels[,]” as a majority of 
his time was spent repairing, cleaning, painting, and 
maintaining EBI’s thirty vessel fleet.160  Additionally, the 
remainder of his tasks aboard the EBI vessels, which included 
operating the marine crane and securing the deck for voyages, 
were “necessary to the function and operation of any vessel.”161  
The court also found that Naquin’s connection to EBI’s lift-boat 
fleet was substantial in both duration and nature.162  It held 
that the repair, maintenance, and operation tasks that 
occupied seventy percent of Naquin’s time satisfied the 
duration requirement, and that the danger involved in working 
on docked vessels was sufficient exposure to the sea’s perils to 
satisfy the nature requirement of the Chandris test’s second 
 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 933. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
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prong.163 
In a strongly written dissent, Circuit Judge Edith Jones 
asserted that Naquin was not a Jones Act seaman because he 
failed both the duration and nature components of the 
Chandris test’s second prong.164  She attacked the majority’s 
conclusion that Naquin automatically satisfied the duration 
component because seventy percent of his duties were related 
to repair and maintenance of EBI’s fleet of lift boats.165  Circuit 
Judge Jones reminded her colleagues that the Barrett thirty 
percent rule was only a guideline “[a]nd where undisputed 
facts reveal that a maritime worker has a clearly inadequate 
temporal connection to vessels in navigation, the court may 
take the question from the jury[.]”166  She explained that the 
thirty percent figure does not apply to land-based employees 
like Naquin, who work almost exclusively on vessels that 
underwent repairs while moored, jacked-up or docked in the 
shipyard canal.167  According to Circuit Judge Jones, applying 
the Barrett guideline to employees like Naquin essentially 
allows all vessel repairmen to satisfy the duration requirement 
despite their protection from maritime dangers.168  Such a rule 
would disregard the purpose of the Jones Act, as outlined in 
Chandris, to protect a special class of workers who, by the 
nature of their employment, are exposed to unique risks.169  
Similarly, Circuit Judge Jones criticized the majority for 
merely passing over the nature requirement by stating, 
without sufficient support, that employees working on docked 
vessels are exposed to the sea’s perils and dangers.170  She 
distinguished the many cases the majority used to justify its 
conclusion by explaining that those cases involved maritime 
workers whose exposure to and activity at sea were far more 
substantial than Naquin’s.171  Circuit Judge Jones argued that 
 
163. Id. at 933-35 (comparing this case to In re Endeavor Marine, Inc., 
234 F.3d 287 (5th  Cir. 2000)). 
164. Id. at 941-44. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 942 (citing Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 371 (1995)). 
167. Id. 
168. Naquin, 744 F.3d at 942. 
169. Id. at 942-43. 
170. Id. at 944. 
171. See id. 
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Naquin’s primarily land based duties, performed dockside, 
should have prevented his qualification as a Jones Act 
seaman.172 
 
VI.   Why This Holding Was A Mistake & An Alternative 
Approach 
 
The Naquin holding will have a nationwide impact on 
Jones Act litigation going forward.  The Fifth Circuit’s 
“substantial Jones Act caseload” makes it the leader among the 
federal circuits in maritime litigation to which other circuits 
look to for guidance with their own maritime caseloads.173  
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit’s broadening of Jones Act seaman 
status qualification in Naquin will be felt on a substantial 
scale.  Yet its application of the seaman status test in Naquin 
is contrary to the purpose of the Jones Act and has expanded 
its inclusion beyond what Congress intended.  Despite the 
United States Supreme Court’s numerous corrective 
restrictions of the Jones Act seaman definition since 1920, the 
Fifth Circuit has inexplicably determined that a broad, all-
inclusive definition is appropriate.  It has created an over-
qualification of eligibility for a remedy intended for a 
particular, special class of workers.  With its Naquin holding, 
the Fifth Circuit has qualified an entirely new class of workers 
to the benefits and protections of the Jones Act by making 
satisfaction of the Chandris test’s second prong improperly 
 
172. Id. 
173. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995). See, e.g., Cunningham 
v. Interlake S. S. Co., 567 F.3d 758, 761 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Jones v. 
Tidewater Marine, L.L.C., 262 F. App’x. 646, 648 (5th Cir. 2008), to explain 
that in maintenance and cure actions, where there is no specific statute of 
limitations, the equitable defense of latches can serve as a limit on the time 
to bring suit); Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, J/V, 97 F.3d 603, 613 (1st Cir. 
1996) (following the analytical approach employed by the Fifth Circuit in 
determining whether a dual-capacity vessel could be held liable under section 
905(b) of LHWCA for breach of its Scindia duties); Kathriner v. UNISEA, 
Inc., 975 F.2d 657, 661 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing several Fifth Circuit cases 
where court held the structure at issue was not a “vessel in navigation” for 
Jones Act purposes); Hurst v. Pilings & Structures, Inc., 896 F.2d 504, 505 
(11th Cir. 1990) (citing the pre-Chandris test utilized in the Fifth Circuit 
pursuant to its analysis in Guidry v. S. Louisiana Contractors, Inc., 614 F.2d 
447, 452 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
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easy to achieve.174 
First, as Circuit Judge Jones correctly observed in her 
dissenting opinion, the Barrett thirty percent guideline applies 
to truly sea based maritime workers, whose duties and 
responsibilities bring them to sea for at least the minimum 
amount of time.175  The Chandris Court did not hold to the 
contrary.  Despite acknowledging that seamen do not have to 
solely work aboard a vessel to qualify as such and that not all 
ship repairmen, as a matter of law, lack the requisite 
connection, that Court specifically stated, “the Jones Act 
remedy may be available to maritime workers who are 
employed by a shipyard and who spend a portion of their time 
working on shore but spend the rest of their time at sea.”176  By 
allowing repairmen like Naquin, whose duties almost entirely 
involved docked vessels and other land based work, to satisfy 
the duration component of the Chandris test’s second-prong, 
the Fifth Circuit has essentially ensured that all repairmen 
working on temporarily docked or moored vessels for the 
requisite length of time will satisfy that requirement without 
ever being at open sea and exposed to the dangers that 
concerned Congress a century ago. Its holding does away with a 
status based inquiry that the United States Supreme Court 
clearly prefers and returns the analysis to the Haverty Court’s 
locality of injury test that was unmistakably disapproved and 
overruled.177  Qualifying Naquin as a Jones Act seaman 
suggests that any employee that works on a vessel for the 
thirty percent threshold is a seaman, regardless of whether his 
or her work is truly sea based or land based. 
The Fifth Circuit’s holding has also liberalized the nature 
component of the Chandris test’s second prong.  In Chandris, 
the Court explicitly stated that the purpose of the substantial 
connection requirement is to reserve Jones Act protection for 
“sea-based maritime employees whose work regularly exposes 
them to the special hazards and disadvantages to which they 
 
174. See Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927, 942-43 (5th 
Cir. 2014). 
175. See id. 
176. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 364 (citing Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 
502 U.S. 81 (1991)). 
177. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. 
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who go down to sea in ships are subject.”178  It is incorrect to 
characterize Naquin’s exposure to maritime dangers while 
working on docked vessels as similar to those of maritime 
workers who spend extended periods of time at open sea.  The 
particulars of Naquin’s employment did not expose him to the 
same risks of “sudden sicknesses from change of climate, 
exposure to perils, and exhausting labour”179 that those sent to 
sea for substantial periods of time are exposed. Congress was 
not concerned about land based repairmen, like Naquin, who 
could call in sick, stay home, and pick up medicine from a local 
pharmacy if he had a simple cold.  Congress was concerned 
about maritime employees who are often at sea and risk the 
consequences of injuring themselves or falling sick while 
unable to seek appropriate medical attention immediately.  The 
Fifth Circuit has outright ignored the United States Supreme 
Court’s instruction that analysis of the nature component of 
the Chandris test’s second prong focus on whether the 
employee’s duties take him to sea.180  Its holding has nullified 
the characterization of the Jones Act as a special remedy that 
is reserved for a class of workers that are inherently exposed to 
unique risks. 
The consequences of the Fifth Circuit’s Naquin holding are 
alarming.  It has the potential to increase the instances of 
maritime workers walking in and out of Jones Act coverage, a 
situation the courts have striven to avoid.181  It will certainly 
amplify the number of Jones Act cases filed, as land based 
maritime workers, once unquestionably covered exclusively 
under the LHWCA, attempt to seize the advantages of the 
more generous statute.182  The result will be an enormously 
 
178. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 354 (citing Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 
U.S. 85, 104 (1946)). 
179. See Collins supra note 30, at 177. 
180. Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 555 (1997). 
181. Jim Brown & Danielle R. Carlson, Naquin v. Elevating Boats: Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals [Over] Simplifies Its “Seaman Status” Analysis?, 
LEGGE, FARROW, KIMMITT, MCGRATH, & BROWN, L.L.P., Apr. 2014, at 3, 
http://www.leggefarrow.com/assets/docs/news/Newsletter-
NaquinvElevatingBoats.pdf 
182. Id. See also Stuart Crozier, Land Based Workers and Potential 
Jones Act Status, STEAMSHIP MUTUAL, Oct. 2014, 
http://www.steamshipmutual.com/publications/Articles/potentialjonesactstat
us.htm. 
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heavy burden on vessel repair companies and other shipyard 
operators that now must anticipate Jones Act claims from all 
employees that spend thirty percent or more of their time on 
the company vessels, regardless of whether those vessels are at 
open sea, docked, or secured in the company shipyard.183  The 
amount of insurance coverage for Jones Act claims, and 
expenses related thereto, required for such companies will 
increase substantially.184  With a broadened pool of potentially 
injured workers capable of asserting Jones Act claims, 
insurance companies will rewrite their policies and increase 
the premiums demanded from vessel repair companies and 
other shipyard operators.185  Such consequences put maritime 
employers at an unfair disadvantage and make their 
exploitation by employees desiring an easier path to 
substantial recovery more feasible. 
Admittedly, a finite list of maritime occupations that 
qualify for Jones Act seaman status is not preferable.  The 
American economy has always been shaped by the then 
existing state of technology.  It is impossible to predict how 
future advancements will affect the maritime industry or what 
maritime jobs will exist decades from now.  But, with the 
Naquin decision, the Jones Act has departed too far from what 
Congress intended it to be.  At its core, the Jones Act is a 
special protection for maritime employees whose occupation 
exposes them to special dangers that the average American 
worker is not.  The Supreme Court respected this intent and 
developed an analysis that was meant to distinguish the former 
from the latter.186  It also made clear that, when making this 
distinction, one should focus on whether the employee’s duties 
“take him to sea.”187  Certainly, the ideal seaman status test 
 
183. Harry Morse, In Naquin v. EBI, Fifth Circuit Concludes a Plaintiff 
Can be Both a Jones Act Seaman and a Longshoreman, DUNCAN & SEVIN, 
L.L.C., March 18, 2014, http://duncansevin.com/in-naquin-v-ebi-fifth-circuit-
concludes-a-plaintiff-can-be-both-a-jones-act-seaman-and-a-longshoreman/. 
184. Id. 
185. Christopher Hannan, Fifth Circuit Expands Coverage of Jones Act, 
Rules That Shipyard Employee Injured in Shore-Based Crane Incident is a 
Seaman, BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, P.C. (Mar. 
11, 2014),t http://www.bakerdonelson.com/maritime_blog/?entry=474. 
186. See generally Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis , 515 U.S. 347 (1995). 
187. Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 555 (1997). 
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would respect these fundamental principles and also allow for 
future unknowns. 
Therefore, the two prong Chandris seaman status test 
should endure, as the analysis should remain status based.  
This will preserve the congressional intent upon which the 
Jones Act was based through the economic changes and 
technological advancements in the decades and centuries to 
come.  But the second prong of that test should be modified, 
particularly in relation to the implications of the Barrett thirty 
percent threshold.  Instead, a maritime worker whose 
employment requires him to spend thirty percent of his time on 
a vessel at sea188 is a Jones Act seaman.  On the other hand, a 
maritime worker whose employment requires him to spend less 
than thirty percent of his time on a vessel at sea can only be 
deemed a Jones Act seaman if the nature of his employment 
exposes him to the perils of the sea in such a way that he falls 
within the special class of employees that the Jones Act was 
intended to protect.  That additional inquiry shall be a mixed 
question of law and fact.  That is, where there is no reasonable 
interpretation to the contrary, a court must determine whether 
the particular maritime employee is the class of worker that 
Congress intended to protect through the Jones Act.  But, 
where reasonable persons could differ as to whether the 
particular employee falls within that class of worker, when 
considering all other relevant factors, it is a question of fact for 
the jury. 
Thus, satisfaction of the duration component equals 
satisfaction of the nature component, because those who 
perform at least thirty percent of their duties at sea are 
presumptively exposed to the unique dangers that accompany 
such employment.  But failing to satisfy the duration 
component does not necessarily preclude designation as a 
seaman.  The burden is then placed on the maritime plaintiff, 
who is seeking a special remedy, to show that he is the type of 
employee that Congress had in mind when it enacted the Jones 
Act.  By focusing the analysis on which workers are sent to sea 
in the course of their employment, the courts can ensure that 
the congressional intent supporting the Jones Act’s enactment, 
 
188. That is, aboard unsecured vessels while at open-water. 
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and the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of what 
that intent demands, will not be lost, while also allowing for 
future advancements in the maritime industry. 
 
VII.    Conclusion 
 
The most recent chapter in the Jones Act’s tortured history 
includes a movement away from what was intended by 
Congress nearly a century ago. The Fifth Circuit’s holding in 
Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C. has broadened the scope of 
maritime employees eligible for the Jones Act’s special 
protections in a way that has removed the special nature that 
Congress intended to attach to the statute. Upon its next 
opportunity, it is imperative that the United States Supreme 
Court restore Jones Act seaman status qualification to its 
proper reach. 
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